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The Central ity of Art 
in Classic American Philosophy 
Victorino Tejera 
Despite its popular reputation for vulgar pragmatism, classic American 
philosophy since Peirce has always taken art to be of prime importance in 
understanding the human condition. While this may be no surprise to most 
historians of ideas, it may well be news to our modern practitioners of philosophy, 
given that in phenomenology the art object is turned into a "cognitive" object and 
that, in analytic philosophy, art is the last and least of subject-matters. Moreover, 
analytic aesthetics defines itself as the study, not of art, but of the language in 
which we discuss art.1 A cognitive object, in today's philosophical climate, is 
something "known" in the sense that the objects of the special sciences are said 
to be known. And this is the usage that has created an unquestioned contrast 
between objects of knowledge and objects of appreciation, as if appreciation was 
not also—like art itself—a matter of reflection. 
Thus, the writings of C. S. Peirce, founder of a pragmatic modern theory of 
signs, show that, as early as age eighteen, Peirce had a good sense of the 
implications that art has for the philosophic understanding of the human condi-
tion. In a note of 1857 he refuted Schiller's careless claim that "the sense of beauty 
never furthered the performance of a single act of duty," by showing that beauty 
"places the mind in a state of 'infinite determinableness' so that it can turn in any 
direction and is in perfect freedom; hence, beauty is in the highest degree fruitful 
with respect to knowledge and morality."2 While another note of the same year 
concluded that Michaelangelo was guided in his art by intellectuality in contrast 
to Raphael, whose art came out of his sensibility, Peirce never made the sharp 
distinction between sense and intellect which both rationalism and empiricism 
had bequeathed to the Idealist tradition. We note that craft, or artisanship, and 
mechanical invention are aerily relegated, by this overdrawn distinction, to a 
station beneath philosophy. 
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Historically, the deep background that reinforced this blind spot and kept it 
from being questioned was the Stoics banishment of poetics and rhetoric from the 
divisions of philosophy. This meant that the arts of making and of producing 
effects—arts that every real construction must use—were now beyond self-
reflection or foundational thought. Despite the concerns of Plato's Gorgias, 
Phaedrus or HippiasMajor and Aristotle's Poetics mARhetoric, and to the great 
impoverishment of European thought, the Stoics reduced the subject-matter of 
philosophy to physics, logic and ethics. The effect of this impoverishment can be 
seen in such would-be inclusive transmitters of the classical heritage as Christian 
Wolff(1679-1754).3WolffbequeathedtoA.Baumgarten(1714-62)andtamanuel 
Kant the idea of an aesthetics in which feeling processes can be, and mostly are, 
purely sensory, i.e., purged of "intellection," as the conceptual dimension of 
human intellect had come to be called. We must say at once that this is an infirm 
idea. Meantime neither the wave of Hegelianism that swept nineteenth-century 
intellectual America nor the renewed study of Kant did much to heal this 
infirmity—despite the flourishing state of the mechanical arts and the new 
profitability of inventiveness in America. More exactly, idealist thought in 
America did not do much for the arts until the arrival of such American readers 
of Kant and Hegel as C. S. Peirce, John Dewey and George Santayana. 
In Aristotle, human selectivity or responsiveness, i.e., all intellectual pro-
cess, comes under the notion of dianoia, namely, thinking or reflecting. Artistic 
production and performance, human practices such as politics and surgery, are all 
special but real knowledges; they are different kinds of knowledge, not inferior 
degrees of it as defined by the conceptualists. These activities, of course, involve 
feeling, either in the way of using, giving shape to, or informing it; or else, of 
producing it for specific purposes. Neither Aristotle nor any of the pre-Hellenistic 
Greeks radically separated aisthêsis (perceiving) from noêsis (minding, thinking 
of) in the way that fourth century Pythagoreans, Alexandrians and Neoplatonists 
were to separate them. When, for example, Homer portrayed Odysseus as 
longing to see the smoke rising from his homestead in Ithaca again, the verb he 
used was a form of noein: Odysseus's noêma, here, is clearly something/e/f and 
something sensed as well as something known. It is this fusion, or overlap, of 
aesthetic (sensory) with noetic (thinking) processes that I have sought to restore 
to pre-Hellenistic thought from Parmenides to Aristotle, as an inheritance from 
J. H. Randall and classic American philosophy.4 Classic American philosophy 
has always, from Peirce to Randall and Buchler, avoided dissociating intellect 
and emotion in the way that has led to the impasses that plague both British 
empiricism and continental European philosophy. American philosophic histo-
rians, consequendy, do not read back into Parmenides, Plato or Aristotle the 
separation of feeling from reason that first gained currency among post-Classical 
thinkers in the West. 
Similarly, the point of Peirce's paragraph 5.501 is that the medieval scholas-
tic logicians attributed to concepts the very same characters that he attributes to 
qualities of feeling, and that feelings are general in reference, in the same way that 
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concepts are.5 Peirce is not just reminding us, at 5.283, that feelings accompany 
thought, but that feelings are signs, namely, have reference or meaning: 
whenever we think, we have present to the consciousness some 
feeling, image, conception, or other representation which 
serves as a sign... it follows from our existence that everything 
. . . present to us is a phenomenal manifestation of ourselves. 
This does not prevent its being a phenomenon of something 
without us, just as a rainbow is at once a manifestation both of 
the sun and the rain. When we think, then, we ourselves as we 
are at that moment, appear as a sign. Now a sign has, as such, 
three references: first it is a sign to some thought which in-
terprets it; second, it is a sign for some object to which in that 
thought it is the equivalent; third, it is a sign, in some respect 
or quality, which brings it into connection with its object 
In paragraph 1.313, tones and colors are said to be signs, respectively, of qualities 
of feeling or moods: 
A mere presentment may be a sign Some colors are called 
gay, others sad. . . . tones are signs of visceral qualities of 
feeling odors are particularly apt to act as signs [by] natural 
associations of different ideas. 
In the next note (1.314) Peirce makes the point that we know that people's feelings 
about a given thing can be similar. And at 5.475 Peirce adds that some signs have 
what he calls "emotional interprétants;" and these may be "more than a feeling of 
recognition." He says, further, that the emotional interprétant is sometimes the 
only proper signification of a sign: "the performance of a piece of... music is 
a sign. It conveys, and is intended to convey... musical ideas; [and] these usually 
consist... in a series of feelings." Since interprétants are themselves signs, we 
see that emotions are signs, and as significations they convey something even 
when "only" effects. It is also clear that musical feelings are of the nature of ideas 
for Peirce. Thus we can make sense of his remark, at 5.434, that "the reasonable 
purport of a word is not the only kind of meaning there is."6 Now, signs need not 
be always interpreted pragmatically; for, they are not always acted upon at once 
or in practice—as beliefs are in the pragmatic account It is indeed the pragmatic 
view that the meaning of an idea is to be found in its consequences. But just as a 
concept is not the less a concept because it is not acted upon, so feelings are not 
the less signs because they have consequences—as in listening to music—that 
need not be acted upon at once. 
Not only must we grant that Peirce's theory of signs is comprehensive, but 
his conception of knowledge will be seen as wider than that of the Stoics, 
Platonists, positivists and phenomenologists. It is consonant with this breadth 
85 
that Peirce explicitly states in his definition of logic as the science of inquiry that 
"Ethics or the science of right and wrong, must appeal to Esthetics for aid in 
determining the... greatest good." He also states that while logic "also depends 
upon phenomenology and... mathematics," as "the theory of self-controlled, or 
deliberate, thought, [logic] as such must appeal to ethics for its principles" 
(1.191). Itisaesthetics,then,thatispresupposedbyethicsandlogic,andnotlogic 
that is presupposed by aesthetics, as contemporary Anglo-Analytic philosophers 
mistakenly maintain. We are also forced to note that "science," here, must 
include—as in Aristotle—other species of knowledge than the theoretical.7 In the 
above, we recognize something akin and basic to Santayana's ideas on the 
relations between morality and aesthetics. Since it is our feelings, not something 
external, says Santayana, that gives the world of perception its value: 
philosophers ought not to feel that unless moral and aesthetic 
judgments are expressions of objective truth . . . not merely 
expressions of human nature, they stand condemned of hope-
less triviality; on the contrary, triviality consists in abstraction 
from human interests.. .8 
As Santayana says, "for the existence of good in any form it is not merely con-
sciousness but emotional consciousness that is needed."9 In any case, both aes-
thetic and moral judgments are judgments of value for Santayana; they contrast 
with judgments of fact. The value of the latter is only derivative or, as we now 
say, only instrumental; namely, a fact takes on value when judged to be a good 
means to a given end.10 Morality, Santayana suggests, is mainly concerned with 
the prevention of suffering. Accordingly, while "aesthetic judgments are mainly 
perceptions of good, moral judgments are mainly and fundamentally negative, or 
perceptions of evil."11 
Santayana's Reason in Art, with its definition of "art" as the principle of art 
activity, not only its product, provides very strong evidence for my argument 
"Any operation which... humanizes and rationalizes objects is called art." Note 
that it is not only artfulness that must be analyzed to understand art and invention 
or construction in technology and the sciences; but Santayana is also saying that 
art is the very motor and principle of civilization itself. "Until art arises, all 
achievement... dies with the individual, and even in him spends itself without 
recovery, like music heard in a dream." It is art that is transmissible and makes 
possible "the sustained advance in rationality" that creates civilization: "progress 
is art bettering the conditions of existence."12 
Rational progress can be hoped for because, just as art "perpetuates its own 
function" and requires a medium (as Dewey was to emphasize later), so "mind 
grows self-perpetuating only by its expression in matter."13 But rationality can 
only be itself as a fusion of "impulse and ideation." A divorce of these two "would 
reduce man to a brute or a maniac. The rational animal is generated by the union 
of these two monsters."14 For, "reason and humanity begin with the union of 
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instinct and ideation." If the life of impulse could be perfectly coordinated with 
the life of reflection, 
intelligence would be at once the universal method of practice 
and its continual reward. All reflection would then be appli-
cable in action, and all action fruitful in happiness.15 
In realizing that this can be only an ideal, Santayana notes that nonetheless 
it is one that all individuals, in fact and at one time or another, partially embody. 
Having noted that progress is measured only by reference to some ideal, 
Santayana then remarks that the Positivist philosophers—who claim to believe in 
progress—lack a positive ideal by which to judge it. In 
discarding] the [intellectual] machinery in which their ances-
tors embodied the ideal, they have not perceived that those 
symbolfic forms of the ideal] gave fantastic... expression to 
what, in itself, is pure humanity; they have thus remained 
entangled in the [nominalist] error that ideals are.. . adventi-
tious and unmeaning, not having a soil in mortal life nor a 
possible fulfillment there.16 
In other words, it is the failure of nonpluralist philosophies to see past philosophic 
and poetic achievements as intellectual and expressive constructions that leads 
them to think that those constructions are now meaningless. And this, of course, 
is a failure of both aesthetic and historical sensibility; it is, namely, a philistine 
failure to respond to the art in the intellectual products of the culture that has, in 
part, produced our own generation. 
Similarly, when G. H. Mead's article on aesthetic experience reiterates his 
insistence that a sense of the past is required for a good understanding of the 
present, it also makes the deeper point that the sense of the past presupposes the 
aesthetic sense.17 Mead does not only deplore the "break" in the Western tradition 
between the practical and material, on one hand, and the imaginative and spiritual, 
on the other; he also sees the way in which shared aesthetic experiences spill over 
into the everyday and into the creation of better realized communities. And this 
resonates with the idea, implicit in William James's works, that creativity is a 
condition of the social process and of man's survival. Finally, in Mind, Self, and 
Society, Mead analyzes the roles of the "I" and the "me" in the process of creative 
innovation, and the varying effects produced by the ways in which the "I" and the 
"me" counterbalance each other in the productive individual. The key, of course, 
to what makes Mead, and other classic Americans, sensitive not only to the social 
nature of the individual but also to the aesthetic dimension of experience, is the 
insight that takes nature and human nature to be constitutive of each other.18 
While the centrality of the arts to philosophy is taken for granted in different 
but unselfconscious ways by Santayana and Justus Buchler, it is in Dewey's work 
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that it becomes a distinctive tenet of American pragmatism. Dewey sought to 
dissolve the standard misleading discontinuity between "art" and "science," 
posited by empiricism and positivism, by articulating the observable connections 
between art and religion, art and survival, art and everyday life. As he says in Art 
as Experience, neither art, nor science, nor civilization can be understood by 
"theories which isolate art and its appreciation" from other kinds of human 
activity.19 The aesthetic, for Dewey, is a pervasive dimension of human 
experience. Before they were sectioned off, what we now call art and science 
were actually—in the history of the development of the arts that Dewey equates 
with the history of human experience—aspects of one another. These aspects of 
invention and discovery, of what Aristotle called technê (which inchxdtdpoiêtikê 
andpraktikê), were also pursued separately and for their own sake. But there is 
as much thinking, or reflection, in the one as the other. Dewey calls the artist's 
reflection "medium-bound thinking," while that of the scientist is both theoretical 
(in Aristotle's sense) and experimental or operational. He furthermore insists that 
"no experience of whatever sort is a unity unless it has esthetic quality."20 Since 
art is a kind of making as well as a kind of experience, a human product as well 
as the very principle of production, and art or the aesthetic are qualities of different 
kinds of experience as well as themselves special kinds of experience, it becomes 
possible to propose that artistic activity be taken as a visual model for all other 
forms of human activity.21 
Like Dewey, but in a more systematic way, Buchler refuses to give special 
preference to physical science or its methods as models for other human activities 
or the quest for knowledge. Inquiry is only one species of query, and deduction 
is only one species of reflection. Action and construction can also be forms of 
query that seek knowledge. There is as much to be learned about the human 
condition or the effects of our involvement with nature from reflective conduct 
or active judgment, from reflective construction or exhibitive judgment when 
they are questioning, as there is from the different way in which scientific inquiry 
questions natural and social processes. But we must understand, Buchler 
observes, that it is art as art and action or performance as action that provide 
knowledge, not the aesthetic object as the object of discourse—as in Roland 
Barthes—or the aesthetic object transformed into a cognitive object, as in Mikel 
Dufrenne's phenomenological aesthetics.22 
In conclusion, I would suggest that these historical observations are both 
basic and revisionary. They bring back into American philosophic reflection 
neglected data from the practice of the arts and the experience of creativity, 
namely, data from the active and exhibitive as well as the logical dimensions of 
human judgment. Awareness of the reflective quality ^ /actions and in constructions 
will not only enrich and clarify current impoverished notions of rationality, by 
restoring to it its affective and imaginative components, it will close the gap 
between professional students of "pure thought" and thinkers in other fields than 
philosophy. And it will do this by reawakening in us a sense of the creative quality 
present in all the distinctively human activities, from science to surgery, from 
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poetry to politics, from sport and entertainment to the giving of form to our daily 
lives. In connection with the current excess of logicism in philosophy and its 
almost exclusive concern with "language," it is not just that the assertive or logical 
model of language ceases to serve philosophy, but that philosophy itself can now 
be seen to be not just a matter of clarity and consistency only, but rather as a way 
of sensitizing us to the polysemy of language, namely, to the multiple significa-
tions of words in discourse that is not scientific. Philosophy must also address the 
many ways of achieving coherence that can be found in practice, in artisanship 
or productivity, all of which show the model of consistency that is derived from 
the theoretical sciences to be just one among other species of coherence. 
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